The intuition of neutrality and consequentialist thinking: potential antinatalist implications

Karl Pettersson

Many people seem to share some version of what has been called the "intuition of neutrality" about creating new people, which, roughly, says that there exists a certain range of levels of well-being such that creating people within this range is, in itself, morally neutral, but creating people with a level of well-being outside this range is not morally neutral. In this paper, I will discuss different interpretations of this intuition, and specifically distinguish between what I will call counterfactual interpretations and Do-interpretations of the intuition. I will argue that it is hard to interpret the intuition in a way that does not give rise to antinatalist moral reasons, i.e. reasons favoring an empty future population, when it comes to choices of social policy. In particular, this holds if we assume a conception of relevant outcomes of actions reflecting consequentialist moral intuitions. In the end, I will formulate a normative principle of welfare promotion which I argue respects the most plausible counterfactual version of the neutrality intuition.