@umbertoleon Los análisis funcionales no serían más que descripciones incompletas de mecanismos. Por si te interesa una defensa de esto, te dejo este artículo bien bueno y digerible. Muestra bien por qué el enfoque mecanicista no tiene nada de reduccionist
Currently reading: "Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches" by Piccinini & Craver & "Looking down, around, and up: Mechanistic explanation in psychology" by Bechtel https://t.co/2EK06auxZC https://t.
@KMKing_Psych I've only skimmed this but it seems like a relevant synthesis* of the tension you're expressing: https://t.co/P9XEmKvGVe *literally the journal it's published in
@talyarkoni @WiringTheBrain @bogglerapture @KriegeskorteLab @drgjdcam @neurograce one thought:@WiringTheBrain argument about high-level laws "constraining" isnt inconsistent with high-level laws being fully reducible. The idea of a hard break between "leve
@wurstkase_ get ya some better shit :) : https://t.co/8k757uNWYl
@jayvanbavel @distributedcog I also thought that was a bold claim. I guess I’d always thought the important part of mechanistic explanation was decomposition in simpler components, not determinisitic explanation. If so, psychological mechanistic explanatio